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Book Review
Tracy A. Thomas, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist Foundations of Family Law,
New York, NY: New York University Press, 2016, pp. 328, $55, Cloth.
Reviewed by Paula A. Monopoli
Mother. Author. Orator. Woman Suffrage Leader:1
The Feminist Legacy of Elizabeth Cady Stanton
Tracy Thomas’s new book, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Feminist Foundations
of Family Law, provides extensive support for the claim that Stanton was “the
intellectual giant of the [women’s rights] movement.”2 In this eminently
readable yet deeply substantive work, Professor Thomas argues that Stanton
was a foundational theorist for modern feminism. Until recently, Stanton’s
intellectual contributions have not been widely explored,3 and Thomas aims
to rectify that oversight. She situates Stanton in her rightful place by focusing
on Stanton’s writings and advocacy in the area of family law. Thomas does a
persuasive job, using Stanton’s views on marital property law, divorce, voluntary
and involuntary maternity, and the custody of children as a lens through
which to examine broader themes about women’s status as equal citizens in
our republic. She also documents Stanton’s intellectual contributions in a way
that informs current debates about gender equality.
While Stanton’s writings ranged broadly on the subordination and
emancipation of women, Thomas narrows in on Stanton’s views on the
subjugation of women within marriage. She also reveals Stanton’s extensive,
if de facto, training in law through her father’s practice, law library and clerks.
“As a young woman, Stanton had read widely in her father’s law library and
discussed cases with him . . . . [H]er legal training allowed Stanton to bring to
the early women’s rights movement a keen sense of the role of law in creating
Paula A. Monopoli is Sol & Carlyn Hubert Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Carey
School of Law. She teaches property, trusts and estates and a seminar on gender in the legal
profession. Her scholarship focuses on the intersection of inheritance and family law, as well as
gender and constitutional design.
1.

These are the words inscribed on Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s gravestone (16).

2.

Gretchen Ritter, The Constitution as Social Design: Gender and Civic Membership
in the American Constitutional Order 17 (2006).

3.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Feminist as Thinker: A Reader
(Ellen Carol DuBois & Richard Cándida Smith eds., 2007).
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inequality between the sexes.”4 Thomas argues that this understanding of the
common law itself and her understanding of how to construct legal arguments
were central to Stanton’s efficacy as a theorist and an advocate.
Thomas begins by examining Stanton’s personal story. Stanton was a
harried mother of three children under the age of ten when she convened the
first women’s rights convention in Seneca Falls in 1848.5 In the decade that
followed, she went on to have four more children and to advocate tirelessly for
women’s equality. Thomas points out how much the adage “the personal is the
political” applied to Stanton, as she wrote to her partner in advocacy, Susan
B. Anthony, for help:
Can you get any acute lawyer . . . sufficiently interested in our movement
to look up just eight laws concerning us—the very worst in all the code? I
can generalize and philosophize easily enough myself; but the details of the
particular law I need, I have not time to look up. You see, while I am about
the house, surrounded by my children, washing dishes, baking, sewing, etc.,
I can think up many points, but I cannot search books, for my hands as well
as my brains would be necessary for that work . . . . Men who can, when they
wish to write a document, shut themselves up for days with their thoughts
and their books, know little of what difficulties a woman must surmount (54).

These words would resonate with many female scholars today. After this
first letter, Stanton again wrote to Anthony to tell her that the legislative
testimony she was trying to finish was not nearly done and that her deadline
was rapidly approaching. Anthony responded by coming to babysit while
Stanton finished the address (54-55). Having a public voice requires time
and energy. But bearing a disproportionate share of family caregiving makes
such public participation difficult and remains a structural barrier to gender
equality today.
Thomas integrates these and similar examples of the connection between
the nineteenth-century Stanton and modern-day feminists. She begins her
book with an introduction that gives the reader a thumbnail sketch of modern
feminist theory. Thomas outlines the distinctions among liberal feminism,
with its focus on formal equality; difference feminism, with its focus on
resolving subordination by recognizing women’s biological, relational, and
cultural differences; and radical or dominance feminism, which situates
subordination in the victimization of women as sexual objects and emphasizes
the need for structural reforms (20).6 Thomas argues that Stanton’s views on
4.

Id. at 7-8.

5.

Ritter, supra note 2, at 17.

6.

In addition, Thomas defines first-, second-, and third-wave feminism: The first, she says, was
focused on the vote in the nineteenth century; the second was focused on formal equality in
employment and abortion in the 1970s; and the third was a “movement against reductionism
to a few ‘women’s’ issues” (36). Thomas argues that Stanton moved beyond formal equality
and was a “holistic” feminist thinker who understood that formal equality in law was
necessary but not sufficient to achieve full equality. Indeed, reform of the very structure
of the family and of political, social, and religious institutions was necessary for women to
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family law reform informed modern feminist theory. And in developing those
views, Stanton drew on such feminist thinkers of her own time as Margaret
Fuller, author of Woman in the Nineteenth Century, and abolitionist Sarah Grimke,
author of Letters on the Equality of the Sexes. She had also read the work of earlier
political theorists, including Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman (19-20).
This intellectual debt that second- and third-wave feminists owed to Stanton
has its roots in Stanton’s belief that women’s subjugation was most entrenched
in marriage. Thus, reform of marital relations was essential to dismantling
broader gender inequality in society as a whole. Stanton’s early advocacy in
the 1840s included direct challenges to marital property laws grounded in
the coverture doctrine of the English common law. In an era of general legal
reform, including consolidation of the equity and law courts, the decade was
an opportune time to also push for legal reforms relating to women’s status.
Property ownership, in particular, was an important legal principle to use
as a fulcrum, since it represented legal agency and was deeply connected to
political theories about who had full citizenship in society.
Thomas argues that Stanton’s personal story is important in that her father,
Daniel Cady, was a property lawyer and judge. Stanton had seen widows
coming into her father’s office seeking assistance after having been deprived of
hearth and home by common-law property doctrines, with very little protection
afforded them by the ancient and limited concept of dower (42). In addition,
the common-law doctrine of coverture severely limited a married woman’s
ability to retain property she brought into a marriage or to own property she
was given or had inherited. Daniel Cady tried very hard to give his daughter
property outside the control of her husband, Henry Stanton, using careful
drafting around such legal limitations (43-44). Stanton’s long but unhappy
marriage to Henry, who was often absent and not financially successful, had a
significant influence on her views about marital property as well (7).
Both coverture and dower were reflections of biblical and legal theories that
embraced the idea that, in terms of authority and harmony, there could only
be one head of the family and that was the husband. Through her writing,
Stanton focused on the moral arguments against this premise and against its
expression in the marital property laws of the time (46). Stanton took a radical
position in advocating specifically for joint property—the first of her radical
positions on marital rights, but certainly not the last. In the wake of New
York’s refusal to embrace feminist demands for a community property regime,
Stanton worked her political networks in Albany from 1844 through 1849
to achieve reforms that allowed women to convey and devise their separate
inherited property (49-51).7
achieve full equality (21).
7.

Much as some state courts later cabined the impact of the Nineteenth Amendment by
narrow construction, they also cabined the impact of the Married Women’s Property Acts
via the same judicial technique (193). This perceived threat to the social order from gender
equality is a continuing theme across thousands of years and a variety of cultures. We see
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Thomas argues that Stanton’s intellectual leadership informed secondwave feminism and laid the foundation for third-wave feminism. As she notes,
Stanton transcended the two waves in that she clearly understood that formal
equality was necessary but not sufficient for full equality. We are still working
to achieve Stanton’s vision of equality in a number of areas, including the
marital property rights she fought so hard to establish. We still have facially
neutral laws like ERISA that distort the accumulation of property within intact
marriages, resulting in a disproportionate share of couples’ property in the
sole name and control of the husband.8 Fewer than ten states have community
property regimes. The vast majority still adhere to a separate property
framework in which the spouse who has financial power within the marriage
can defeat equal ownership by titling the property in his name alone.9 Even at
death, a number of states still have the remnants of dower in the form of the
traditional elective share. In those states, a widow whose husband disinherited
her may be left a mere one-third of his estate, and that one-third does not
include nonprobate property or property held in trust.10 Stanton’s theory of
marriage as a joint economic partnership has still not been fully implemented
in modern American property or inheritance law.11
Stanton is better-known as a suffragist than for her efforts at property
and inheritance law reform. But it is not surprising that her early theories on
marital property laid the foundation for her later work on universal suffrage.
The concept of being able to own property is closely tied to the franchise.
Stanton theorized that securing women’s legal agency through property
ownership was an important link to securing the right to vote. After working
on marital property rights reform for more than a decade, Stanton constructed
as far back as ancient Greece playwrights detailing the fear that a woman challenging the
state arouses in those in power: “Therefore it is we must assist the cause of order; this forbids
concession to a feminine will; better be outcast, if we must, of men than have it said a woman
worsted us; foul-spotted heart—a woman’s follower.” Sophocles, Antigone (Sir George Young,
trans., 1993). Similarly, one New York legislator wrote of Stanton and other feminists: “It is
well known that the object of these unsexed women is to overthrow the most sacred of our
institutions, to set at defiance the Divine law which declares man and wife to be one . . . .”
(57).
8.

See Paula A. Monopoli, Marriage, Property and [In]Equality: Remedying ERISA’s Disparate Impact
on Spousal Wealth, 119 Yale L.J. Online 61 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/
marriage-property-and-inequality-remedying-erisas-disparate-impact-on-spousal-wealth.

9.

Angela M. Vallario, The Elective Share Has No Friends: Creditors Trump Spouse in the Battle over the
Revocable Trust, 45 Capital U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4 n.26), https://
papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2856659.

10.

Id. at 2.

11.

Some of the most powerful parts of Thomas’s book are the passages that link the laws
governing marital property and relations at the time to custody and sexual intimacy.
Mothers could not legally oppose the indenturing out of their minor children to third
parties. It reminds us how that legal framework, which rendered women unable to stop the
indentured servitude of minor children and unable to refuse sexual relations at any time
within marriage, was tantamount to legal servitude for women in Stanton’s era.
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a constitutional framework for women’s full citizenship.12 Her efforts, however,
to have women explicitly included in the Reconstruction Amendments or,
failing that, to have the United States Supreme Court interpret the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include voting for
women, all failed.13 So a new amendment was needed. Stanton was the first
woman to testify before Congress on what would have been the Sixteenth
Amendment, guaranteeing women’s suffrage. In her 1878 testimony before the
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, she connected voting to the
other reforms for which she had fought:
Few people comprehend the length and breadth of the principle we are
advocating to-day, and how closely it is allied to everything vital in our system
of government. Our personal grievances, such as being robbed of property and
children by unjust husbands; denied admission into the colleges, the trades,
and profession; compelled to work at starving prices, by no means round out
this whole question. In asking for a sixteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the protection of Congress against the injustice of State law,
we are fighting the same battle as Jefferson and Hamilton fought in 1776, as
Calhoun and Clay in 1828, as Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis in 1860,
namely, the limit of State rights and federal power. The enfranchisement of
woman involves the same vital principle of our government that is dividing
and distracting the two great political parties at this hour.14

The suffrage amendment came to fruition only after Stanton’s death in 1902,
in the form of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
ratified in 1920. That amendment would likely not have passed had Stanton
not laid its intellectual and legal foundation. She provided the basis for her
successors to argue that the franchise was essential to full citizenship and
was the central instrument in forming a government that reflected the full
experience and concerns of its female citizens.
After laying out Stanton’s theories and advocacy around marital property
rights, Thomas proceeds to detail Stanton’s ideas around such other family law
12.

See Ritter, supra note 2, at 16-20. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, provided that
all “persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” It further prohibited
the states from “abridg[ing] the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”
After losing the legislative battle for women to be explicitly included in the new Fourteenth
Amendment, Stanton and other feminist activists of the time took a new tack. This “New
Departure” was an effort to have the courts find that the terms of the new amendment
included women. But that effort failed with the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). The Court found that suffrage in particular was a
matter of state citizenship and not national citizenship. If suffrage had not been extended
to women by a state at the founding of the nation, this new amendment did not extend it to
women. It simply protected state privileges they already had in this regard. Id.

13.

See Happersett, 88 U.S. at 162. Thomas argues that Stanton was an early proponent of a
dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation as opposed to what we would now call
originalism (69-70).

14.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Feminist as Thinker, supra note 3, at 226–27.
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issues as divorce, custody, the right to refuse sexual relations within marriage,
the role of women in organized religion, and the benefits of coeducation.
In each chapter, Thomas builds on her argument that Stanton’s theories of
law reform in areas concerning the private sphere of the family informed her
views and advocacy as they related to the relationship between women and
the state in the public sphere. She persuades the reader that without Stanton’s
ideas, which seem surprisingly modern, second-wave feminism and third-wave
feminism would have lacked a firm theoretical grounding.
Stanton’s radical views on marriage, including divorce at will and women’s
status in the Bible, alienated her supporters as the nineteenth century
came to a close. And her vehement rhetoric, deployed in opposition to the
enfranchisement of black men and male immigrants before white women,
reminds us that she was not a leader without flaws. Like Alice Paul and the
final battle for a federal suffrage amendment,15 Stanton’s story is messy. But so
is the story of most male political leaders, like Thomas Jefferson and George
Washington when it comes to slavery and their personal behavior. Unlike
those men, Stanton never had the chance to hold formal leadership in our
republic. Yet hers was a rare and influential female voice in the public sphere
of her time.
Law can only do so much. As Stanton and feminist scholars who followed
her have recognized, the final battle for equality lies in the private sphere—in
those intimate negotiations between spouses and partners about spheres of
influence and responsibility within the home.16 And, in conjunction with our
jurisprudence moving from status to contract, such negotiated “deals” have
the power to transform gender roles in ways that are essential to full equality.
The only arguable weakness in this book is that after the trenchant
introduction, Thomas does not do much to connect back to the different
strands of feminist theory per se. But in my view, the main strength of the
book lies in Thomas as legal historian pulling together the arguments out
of Stanton’s own writings, making them available to us and linking them to
Stanton’s surprisingly modern legal theories. This book should be included
on reading lists for upper-level seminars in jurisprudence, family law, and legal
history, in addition to gender and the law. Reading it will introduce students
15.

See, e.g., Mary Walton, A Woman’s Crusade (2010). In 1913, Alice Paul was faced with
resistance from other suffragists when African-American women, including Ida WellsBarnett, a founder of the NAACP, petitioned to march in a major suffrage parade in
Washington, D.C. Paul equivocated and “[t]he controversy continued up to the day of the
parade. Afterward, Alice’s failure to unreservedly welcome black marchers left a permanent
stain on her reputation.” Id. at 64.

16.

See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Love’s Promises: How Formal and Informal Contracts
Shape All Kinds of Families (2015). Ertman calls these negotiations or non-legally binding
agreements “deals.” “Deals can be big things, like agreeing to inseminate, or casual, implicit,
daily household exchanges like ‘I pay the bills and you do the grocery shopping.’ They
shape intimate relationships because they create expectations of reciprocity and grounds for
changing the relationship when one person isn’t holding up his or her end of the deal.” Id.
at xiii.
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to a significant legal mind, albeit an informally trained one, not traditionally
included in the canon of prominent American legal thinkers.
Stanton often stated the most important element in achieving equality was
a woman’s “sovereign right” to control her own body (163).17 From that right
followed the ability to earn a living that fostered independence from men. As
Thomas notes, many of the reforms that Stanton wrote about and advocated
for in terms of property, marriage, divorce, and custody have become the
legal status quo. But in these turbulent times, Thomas’s book reminds us how
fragile those gains are and how radical they still seem to many in our society.
As Stanton lamented, after “years of untiring effort” to obtain guarantees
of property and custody, those statutes were “repealed in States where we
supposed all was safe” (194). Her cautionary note to be vigilant rings as loudly
in 2017 as it did in 1876, and we would do well to heed it. Professor Thomas’s
excellent new book has given us additional intellectual tools to do just that.

17.

In Thomas’s discussion of Stanton’s views on abortion, she notes that Stanton wrote, “the
sacred right of a woman to her own person, to all her God-given powers of body and soul”
was a great social and human right “before which all others sink into utter insignificance.”
(232-36).

